
How a Jamaican Pastor Was Deported to Eswatini: A Case Study
This case study examines how a 64-year-old Jamaican pastor with Convention Against Torture protection was deported to Eswatini under the US third-country removal program, revealing how offshore deals bypass legal safeguards and create indefinite detention without charges.
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Junior Alves’s case begins with a contradiction that is easy to miss if it is filed under the neutral label of “third-country removal.” Family members and lawyers describe Alves as a 64-year-old Jamaican pastor who had lived in the United States for 44 years, had no US criminal conviction, and had been granted protection under the Convention Against Torture in 2016. Yet on July 8, 2026, after six months in ICE custody, he was placed on a removal flight to Eswatini, a country he had never visited, and was then held at Matsapha Maximum Security Prison.[1]
That makes this case useful for policy analysis because the question is not only whether the outcome was cruel. The harder question is institutional: what pathway allowed a protection against removal to become ineffective once the destination changed?

The Timeline That Makes the Case Legible
The cleanest way to read the case is chronologically, because each date changes the available legal options. In 2016, according to Alves’s family and lawyers as reported by Jamaican media, a US court granted him CAT protection after he contested two earlier deportation orders. That status did not give him permanent immigration status in the United States. It meant, more narrowly, that a judge had found he could not be removed to a country where he was likely to face torture.[1]
On January 11, 2026, ICE arrested Alves. The same reporting says he remained in US immigration detention for six months before removal. During that period, his family described him not as a fugitive or a criminal defendant but as a father of eight, grandfather of eleven, pastor, and community organizer who fed more than 250 homeless people each week. Those details come from family and lawyer accounts, not from independently published court records or an ICE statement confirming each element.[1][2]
| Date | Event | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| 2016 | Alves is reported to have received CAT protection from a US court. | The protection barred removal to a country where he was likely to face torture, but did not settle what would happen if the US selected another country. |
| January 11, 2026 | ICE arrests Alves. | The case moves from old removal orders into active detention. |
| January-July 2026 | Alves is held in ICE custody for about six months. | Lawyers and family have to respond before the government executes removal. |
| July 8, 2026 | Alves is deported to Eswatini on the fourth known Eswatini group flight. | The destination is neither Jamaica nor a country Alves had previously visited. |
| July 19, 2026 | Alves is reported detained at Matsapha Maximum Security Prison. | The dispute becomes harder to remedy because the person protected by a US ruling is now held abroad. |
The July 8 flight is the point where the paperwork becomes physical. Jamaican reporting said Alves and others refused to sign removal papers before being sent to Eswatini.[1] Third Country Deportation Watch, which tracks the Eswatini removals, lists that flight as the fourth known group flight and reports 30 total deportees across four flights as of its July 10, 2026 update. It also reports that 28 of the 30 remained arbitrarily detained at that time.[3]
As of July 19, 2026, the case was only 11 days past Alves’s removal. That timing matters. It is too soon to treat the record as settled, and any account should leave room for new filings, diplomatic statements, or custody changes. What is already clear enough for a case study is the sequence: CAT protection, ICE arrest, prolonged detention, third-country removal, foreign imprisonment.
What CAT Protected, and What It Did Not Prevent
The Convention Against Torture is often discussed as if it were a shield that stops deportation altogether. In US practice, the protection is narrower. The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act implements the United States’ CAT obligation by prohibiting removal of a person to a country where the person is more likely than not to be tortured. It does not automatically create lawful permanent residence, and it does not necessarily block removal to every possible destination.[4]
That distinction is the opening used by third-country removal. If the government says it is not sending the person to the country covered by the torture finding, it can argue that the CAT bar has not been violated. The practical problem is obvious: the protected person may have no ties, status, counsel, or safe process in the receiving state. The legal question then moves from “may the US deport this person to Jamaica?” to “what process is required before the US sends this person somewhere else?”
Amnesty International describes third-country removals as deportations to countries other than the person’s country of origin, nationality, or regular residence, and says the Trump administration used the practice at scale in 2025 and 2026. Amnesty estimates that about 15,000 people were removed to third countries in 2025 alone.[4] That number measures adoption of the practice, not whether each removal was lawful or whether each person had CAT protection.
A federal district court rejected the administration’s third-country removal policy on February 25, 2026, writing: “It is not fine, nor is it legal.” The ruling found the policy unlawful, but the Supreme Court’s June 2025 stay of the injunction allowed removals to continue while litigation proceeded.[4] Alves’s July 8, 2026 deportation fits inside that procedural gap: a lower-court ruling against the policy existed, but the government still had room to keep removing people pending appeal.
For students building a case-study packet, this is the part to annotate carefully. The protection did not vanish because a judge withdrew it. It became less useful because the government changed the geography of removal and because appellate procedure left the challenged policy operational.
The Eswatini Deal Turns a Legal Loophole Into an Operating System
Alves’s removal was not an isolated improvisation at an airport. It occurred within a US-Eswatini arrangement. The Guardian reported that Eswatini received additional “third country” deportees as part of a deal with the Trump administration, and that the memorandum of understanding was signed on May 14, 2025, after tariff threats and aid cuts.[5]
The BBC later reported that Eswatini confirmed receiving $5.1 million from the United States for accepting deportees. The same reporting said Eswatini’s finance minister stated that his ministry had been “kept in the dark.”[6] Those two facts belong together. Payment shows administrative design; the minister’s reported lack of knowledge suggests opacity inside the receiving government itself.
Amnesty also cites a US Senate investigation finding that the administration paid more than $32 million to five foreign governments for roughly 300 deportees and calling the deals “questionable.”[4] The exact legal meaning of those payments would require the underlying agreements and appropriations record. Still, the pattern is not difficult to teach: removal no longer depends only on the person’s country of citizenship accepting return. It can depend on a separate government agreeing to receive people with whom it may have no ordinary legal relationship.
That is why the phrase “third-country removal” deserves scrutiny. It sounds like destination management. In practice, the destination determines which courts, lawyers, consular officials, prison authorities, and family members can still reach the person.
Matsapha Is Not a Footnote

Once Alves was taken to Matsapha Maximum Security Prison, the case changed from a US removal dispute into an offshore detention problem. Third Country Deportation Watch reported that most deportees sent to Eswatini across the four known flights remained in detention, and lawyers in related Eswatini cases have argued that men sent by the United States were being imprisoned illegally.[3][7]
The available record does not establish that Alves has been charged with a crime in Eswatini. Nor does it show a clear detention timeline, a public removal plan, or a confirmed path to counsel. Prison-condition descriptions in the wider Eswatini deportee litigation come largely from affidavits and detainee statements, not from an independent inspection of Matsapha. That does not make them irrelevant. It means they should be labeled correctly.
For a human rights or public policy class, this is where the case stops being only about deportation. The state action that matters most may already have happened by the time a court can hear the next motion. Alves’s family, attorneys, Jamaican officials, Eswatini officials, US agencies, and civil society groups are now operating after the transfer, not before it.
A Short Comparison: Orville Etoria
Orville Etoria is a useful comparison only if it is kept narrow. He was also Jamaican and was deported by the United States to Eswatini in the first group in July 2025. Unlike Alves, Etoria had served 25 years for murder. AP reported that he was repatriated after about two months through the International Organization for Migration, and that Jamaica’s foreign minister denied that Jamaica had refused repatriation.[8]
The comparison does two limited things. It shows that Jamaican nationals had already appeared in the Eswatini deportation stream before Alves. It also shows that repatriation is possible after transfer. It does not prove that Alves will be repatriated, that his detention will be brief, or that the legal basis for his removal was the same as Etoria’s.
How to Read This as a Case Study
The strongest classroom use of the Alves case is not as a morality play with fixed heroes and villains, even though the human stakes are severe. It is a method exercise in separating legal authority from legal effect. A court order, a detention decision, a removal flight, a bilateral payment, and a prison placement are different actions by different institutions. They compound, but they should not be collapsed into one vague story about immigration enforcement.
- Start with status: what did CAT protection cover, and what did it leave unresolved?
- Mark custody changes: who controlled Alves on January 11, July 8, and July 19, 2026?
- Separate reported claims from confirmed records: family statements, lawyer statements, watchdog counts, agency statements, and court rulings carry different evidentiary weight.
- Track the remedy problem: what could a US court still do once Alves was outside US custody?
- Ask who benefits from ambiguity: if no one publicly owns the detention timeline, the detainee bears the uncertainty.
Students researching this further should treat breaking-news summaries with caution and verify each claim against the source type. A basic source-checking workflow like verifying AI-generated answers for school is especially relevant here because the case contains tempting but unsafe shortcuts: assuming CAT blocks all deportation, assuming every deportee has the same criminal history, or assuming payment alone proves the legal basis of detention.
What Remains Unresolved as of July 19, 2026
Several important facts remain unresolved or only partly sourced. ICE has not, in the materials reviewed here, publicly confirmed the full basis for Alves’s arrest, the government’s assessment of his CAT status, or the specific assurances it relied on before sending him to Eswatini. The public record also does not yet show whether Alves has filed a new US action, whether Eswatini has issued any individualized detention order, or whether Jamaica is actively seeking his return.
Those gaps are not minor. They are part of the case. Third-country deportation can turn individualized protection into a jurisdictional problem: the person protected by a US legal finding is moved to a foreign prison while courts, families, lawyers, ministries, and watchdog groups reconstruct what happened after the most consequential act has already been carried out.
References
- Jamaican pastor among 11 deported by US to Eswatini — Jamaica Observer, 2026/07/09
- ‘They Are Treating Us Like Slaves’: Jamaican Pastor Shipped to Eswatini as Kingston Stays Silent — WiredJA
- Eswatini — Third Country Deportation Watch
- How do US “third country removals” work and are they legal? — Amnesty International, 2026/06
- Eswatini says it received more “third country” deportees as part of deal with Trump administration — The Guardian, 2026/03/12
- Eswatini confirms receiving $5.1m from the US for accepting deportees — BBC
- Lawyers say men deported by US to Eswatini are being imprisoned illegally — The Guardian, 2025/09/02
- A Jamaican man deported by the US to Eswatini has been repatriated — AP News
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